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ABSTRACT: This note characterizes the Weak Weak 
Axiom of Revealed Preference and Wald’s Weak Ax­
iom for not necessarily differentiable demand func­
tions. A theorem which generalizes a previous result 
of Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and Sonneschein (1976) 
and Hildenbrand and Jerison (1989) is presented. It 
is also shown that the theorem cannot be extended 
to the set of not necessarily homogeneous demand 
functions. The method of proof used in this note is 
very simple and lends itself to an immediate geomet­
rical interpretation; it is also shown that it can be 
usefully employed to obtain simpler proofs of other 
results found in this literature.
* I wish to thank Mario Forni and Alan Kirman for reading an ear­
lier draft and for their helpful suggestions. The responsability for any 





















































































































































































A NOTE ON THE DEMAND THEORY OF THE WEAK AXIOMS
Introduction
This note deals with essentially two properties of demand functions, 
the Weak Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WWA) and Wald’s 
Weak Axiom (WALD). WWA is a milder version of Samuelson’s 
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and was first introduced by 
Hicks (1956). Similarly, WALD is a milder version of a condition 
on aggregate excess demand functions proposed by A. Wald in the 
context of general equilibrium theory. The relevance of these two 
concepts is not confined to the theory of individual choice but also 
to equilibrium analysis. Although WWA and WALD are among 
the weakest conditions of consistency of consumer behaviour, when 
possessed by market demand they may turn out to be strong enough 
to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium.
This note characterizes WWA and WALD for demand functions 
which are not necessarily differentiable. In particular it provides a 
Theorem which extends a previous result of Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell 
and Sonneschein (1976) and Hildenbrand and Jerison (1989) which 
characterizes WWA in terms of price derivatives of demand func­
tions and Slutsky compensated demand functions.1 By means of a
1 Specifically, we refer to Theorem 1 and 3 in Kihlstrom et al. (1976) 




























































































recent result of John (1991) and a numerical example it is also shown 
that the the Theorem cannot be extended to the larger set of not 
necessarily homogeneous demand functions.
At the same time, this note offers a somewhat more general 
approach to the analysis of the demand theory of the weak axioms 
which allows very simple proofs. The method of proof used in most 
of the results obtained in this note is very simple and lends itself to 
an immediate geometrical interpretation. It is also shown that this 
method can be usefully employed to obtain simpler proofs of others 
existing results found in this literature.
In the next section the basic notation and definitions are intro­
duced and a preliminary result essentially taken from Hildenbrand 
and Kirman (1988) is presented. Section 2 contains the Theorem 
with a graphical illustration of the proof. Section 3 presents a result 
of John (1991) and a numerical example which show, among other 
things, that the Theorem cannot be extended. Finally, the last sec­
tion gives another application of the method of proof proposed.
1. Notation  and  D efinitions
A demand function is defined as a continuous function f :P x  1R++ —> 
R+, where P  is the set of strictly positive prices P  C R++, satisfying 
budget equality, i.e. p • f(p ,re) =  w. A demand function is homoge­




























































































denoted by T, the subset of homogeneous demand functions by Th- 
An analogous notation is introduced for continuously differentiable 
demand functions, i.e. respectively C 1 and Cjr
The Slutsky compensated demand function at prices q and rel­
ative to point (p ,w) 6 li/ ’+ j is defined by
s(q) =  f(q,q- f(p,«0);
the vector s(q) is the consumption bundle that the consumer would 
demand if the prices changed from p to q and his nominal income 
were compensated so as to keep unchanged his ‘real income’ . The 
compensated income is w' =  q • s(q) =  q • f(p, w) and recall that 
S(P) =
Here is a list of properties of demand functions that are needed 
in the sequel.
Definition 1. A demand function f(p, w) in T  is said to satisfy 
property:
LD (‘Law of Demand’) if f is monotone, i.e.
(q -  p) ■ [f (q, w)  -  f(p, w)] < o,
for all p, q and w.
GLD (Generalized Law of Demand) if the compensated demand 
function s(q) is monotone, i.e.2
P ' [s(q) -  f(p,t«)] > 0,




























































































for all q and all (p, w).
RM (Restricted Monotonicity) if f is monotone on the set of 
prices Pf =  {q € P  | q ■ f(p, w) — w}, i.e.
p • [f(q, w)  -  f(p, ic)] > o,
for all p and w and for all q £ P f.6 Equivalently RM can 
be defined as
q f(p ,w ) =  w implies p • f(q,iu) > w.
WWA if for all (p, w) and (q, w)
p • f(q, u>) < w implies q • f(p, w) > w.
WALD (Wald’s We ale Axiom)'if for all p, q and w,
p • f(q, w) < w implies q ■ f(p, w) > w.
It is evident from the definitions that when demand functions are 
homogeneous the properties WWA and WALD are exactly the same 
thing; so that in Th we will not make any distinction between them. 
Let us introduce three additional properties for demand functions in
C 1.
Definition 2. A demand function f(p, w) in C l is said to sat­
isfy property: 3
3 Clearly we have exploited the fact that q ■ [f(q , w)  — f(p , w)] =  0 




























































































OLD if the matrix of price derivatives of the demand function, 
dpf(p ,w )  =  [dfi(p,w )/dpj]ij, is negative semi-definite, i.e.
v • 3pf(p ,te) • v  < 0
for all v  G R f .
riRM if the matrix of price derivatives of the demand function, 
3pf(p,u>) is negative semi-definite, on the hyperplane Tf =  
{v  G R^ | v • f(p ,tc) =  0}, i.e.
v • <9j,f(p, iu) ■ v < 0
for all v G T f.
NSD if the matrix of substitution terms, S(p, w), i.e. the Jaco­
bian of the compensated demand evaluated at q  =  p, is 
negative semi-definite,
v • S(p, w) ■ v < 0
for all v  G R^.
It is quite intuitive that the properties LD, RM and GLD are re­
spectively the finite counterparts of properties <9LD, <9RM and NSD. 
We shall make this statement precise.






























































































(b) RM  dRM.
(c) GLD NSD.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix and is essentially 
taken, with minor differences, from Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988). 
It is important to stress that homogeneity of demand functions is not 
required by Proposition 1.
In 1976 Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein characterized 
WWA in terms of price derivatives of demand functions; in particular 
they proved that, for demand functions in , the properties WWA, 
dRM and NSD are equivalent.4 By Proposition 1, it is clear that 
the above result can be rephrased by substituting RM and GLD 
respectively for dRM and NSD.
2. The Main Result
In this section we shall strengthen the result of Kihlstrom et al. 
(1976) by extending the equivalence between WWA, GLD and RM 
to the larger set Th of not necessarily differentiable homogeneous 
demand functions.
4 A complete and simpler proof of the result of Kihlstrom et al. 




























































































The main result is derived from two lemmas that we shall present 
separately since they are of interest of their own. Indeed, the lem­
mas have a greater generality since they do not require homogeneity 
of demand functions. Moreover, both of them can be seen as ap­
plications of the same method of proof. As will be seen in the last 
section, this method can also be used to obtain simpler proofs of 
other existing results. The following lemma characterizes the Weak 
Weak Axiom in terms of monotonicity of the Slutsky compensated 
demand.
LEMMA 1. For demand functions in T  the properties GLD and 
WWA are equivalent.
Proof.
WWA =>■ GLD. Let p and q be in P, and take f(p,w) and f(q,u>') 
where w' — q-f(p,w;), i.e. f(q,u/) =  s(q) the compensated demand. 
Since q • f(P  , to) — w' , WWA implies that p • f(q,to') > to, i.e.
P ' [s(q) -  f(p,«>)] > °-
GLD => WWA. We will show that when WWA is violated then GLD 
is not satisfied. Let us assume that WWA is violated, i.e. there exists 
(p, to) and (q, to') such that p • f(q, to') <  to and q • f (p, to) < w' and 
consider the function
g(t) =  q • f(tp, w)
for t G (0,1]. From the above assumption one has g( 1) < w’ . 




























































































q • f(<*p,u>) =  w'. This is not difficult to establish. First, notice 
that from the continuity of the demand function g(t) is continuous. 
Second, by budget equality,
p • f(fp, w) =  j
then, since the above expression tends to infinity as t goes to zero 
and p is finite, at least one of the components of f(tp ,w )  goes to 
infinity as t goes to zero, which means that g(t) - t o o  as f -*  0, since 
q »  0.
Then we have established that there exists 0 < t* < 1 such that 
q • f(t*p,u>) =  w'. Let us consider the effect on demand of a price 
change from f*p to q and notice that f(q , w') is the compensated 
demand at point (t*p, w), indeed s(q) =  f (q ,q  f(<*p, w)) =  f  (q, w'). 
We will show that GLD is violated, i.e.
t*p ■ [f(q, w') -  f(t*p, it;)] < 0.
In fact the left-hand side is equal to f*p ■ f(q, w') — w, where t* is 
strictly less than 1 and, by assumption, p •f(q, w') < w. m
The proof of the proposition GLD => WWA can be given a very 
straightforward graphical illustration. Figure 1 shows a case where 
f(P ,w ) and f(q, w') violate WWA. The dashed line corresponds to 
the budget hyperplane at prices t* p and income w. By construction 
the demand f(t*p, w) must lie at the intersection between the budget 
hyperplanes T(t*p,w ) and T (q ,« /) .  Therefore, the angle between 






























































































The next lemma simply says that Wald’s Weak Axiom amounts 
to requiring the monotonicity of the demand function on a particu­
lar subset of prices (precisely those prices which do not induce any 
income effect).






























































































That WALD =>• RM is immediate from the definitions. We shall 
prove the converse.
RM => WALD. Let us assume that p • f(q, w) <  w; we have to show 
that q • f(p,iu) > w. Consider the demand f(<q, w) and define the 
scalar t* from
p • f(t*q, w) =  w.
Clearly if p • f(q, w) — w, then t* =  1; if p • f(q,u>) < w, consider 
the following function
g(t) =  p f(tq ,tr)
which is continuous and g(l )  < w. Using the same argument as that 
of Lemma 1, one can prove that g(t) —► oo as t —► 0 so that there 
exists 0 < t* <  1. From RM and p • =  w one obtains
U q- [f(p ,w ) - f (< * q  , in)] > 0 so that
t*q • f(p, w) > w.
Then since 0 <  t* <  1 it must be q • f (p ,w )  > w. m
By virtue of Proposition 1, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 allow to 
characterize WWA and WALD in terms of properties of the deriva­
tives of demand functions.
REMARK. For demand functions in C 1, (i) WWA is equivalent 
to NSD; (ii) WALD is equivalent to 9RM.
By noting that WWA and WALD are exactly the same thing 
when demand functions are homogeneous, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 




























































































THEOREM. For demand functions in Th the properties WWA, 
GLD and RM are equivalent.
For later reference as well as to test the validity of the Theorem 
we shall present a result of equivalence between the properties of 
Restricted Monotonicity and Generalized Law of Demand.
Lemma 3. For demand functions in T  the property GLD im­
plies RM. For demand functions in Th the properties GLD and RM  
arc equivalent.
Proof.
GLD => RM. Let us take q £ Pf, one has to show that when GLD 
holds the following expression is non negative,
p • [f(q,«>) -  f(p,«>)] > 0-
This is immediate, by noting that for q  6 Pf demand is equal to 
compensated demand, i.e. s(q) =  f(q , q ■ f(p , w)) =  f(q , w).
RM => GLD. Any vector q(<) S P  can be expressed as a linear 
combination of two vectors, i.e. q(<) =  v  +  ip, where t > 0 and 
v E Tf =  {v  G lRf | v ■ f(p,ry) =  0}, the subspace of vectors 
orthogonal to f(p,ry). Let us consider the following expression
p- [f(q(*),q(*) -f(p,wO) - / ( p,™)];
we have to show that if RM is satisfied the above expression is non­




























































































that q (<) • f(p , w) — tw and by applying homogeneity the above 
expression can be rewritten as:
p.  [ f -  f(p,w)]-
furthermore, since q (t)/t ■ f(p , w) =  w one has that the price vector 
q (<)/< E Pf. Therefore, if RM holds the displayed expression must 
be non-negative. ■
It is important to notice that in the the proof of implication 
RM=J>GLD we had to use homogeneity.
As the last remark notice that the Theorem and Proposition 1 
establish the result of Kihlstrom et al. (1976). Indeed, since C 
Th, the Theorem implies that the equivalence also holds in C\\ part 
(b) and (c) of Proposition 1 do the rest.
3. Some Remarks on Homogeneity
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 3, homogeneity plays its role 
in the implication RM => GLD; this is why we could not extend the 
equivalence established in the Theorem to the set of not necessarily 
homogeneous demand functions. Actually, as we shall see below, this 




























































































In a recent paper, John (1991) proved that WWA implies ho­
mogeneity. By following the same line of proof it is immediate that 
the same holds for GLD.
P roposition  2. For demand functions in T  both WWA and 
GLD imply homogeneity.
Proof.5
We have to prove that f(p , w) =  f(a p , aw), for a  > 0. It is sufficient 
to show that
q • [f (p, w) -  f(a p , ate)] < 0,
for all q £ P. Let us normalize q so that q -f(a p , aw) =  w, therefore, 
to prove the proposition one has to show that q f(p  , w) <  w. Con­
sider the price vectors q(t) =  fq +  (1 — t)p, with t £ [0,1], Clearly, 
q (t) ■ f(a p , aw) — w so that both WWA and GLD imply
(1) p-f(q(t),w)>w.
From budget identity and q(<) • f(q(<),u;) =  w one gets
t [q ■ f(q(<).w) -  H  +  (! - 1) [p • f(q(0> w ) - w ] =  0;
the above expression and inequality (1) imply that q-f(q(<),u>) <  iu, 
then, letting t go to 0, by continuity q • f(p , w) < w. ■
Clearly if one can show that Wald’s Weak Axiom or Restricted 
Monotonicity do not imply homogeneity of the demand function then




























































































the equivalence stated in the Theorem cannot be extended any fur­
ther. Here is the example.
Example. Let us consider the function
for all p and w. It is easily seen that it is continuously differentiable, 
satisfies budget equality, but it is not homogeneous. Take the matrix 
of price derivatives,
The matrix is clearly negative definite so that the demand function 
is strictly monotone and certainly satisfies RM and Wald’s Weak 
Axiom.
This very simple example allows us to make some interesting 
remarks. In the first place, irrespective of whether demand functions 
are differentiable or not, even the ‘Law of Demand’ in its strongest 
version is not a sufficient condition for homogeneity. Therefore, if one 
is interested in modelling consumer behaviour but is not prepared 
to assume absence of money illusion one can still retain some degree 
of consistency of choice by adopting Wald’s (Weak) Axiom or any 
other property related to the monotonicity of demand functions.
On the other hand, by Proposition 2, if one is interested in prop­




























































































compensated demand, such as WWA or Samuelson Weak Axiom of 
Revealed Preference, one is left less freedom in modelling consumer 
behaviour since he cannot help assuming implicitly homogeneity.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have not drawn all the conclusions from the results presented 
in this note. Lemma 1, 2, 3, and Proposition 1 and 2 can be com­
bined in various way in order to provide other results available in 
the literature. For example we have already deduced the above men­
tioned results of Kihlstrom et al. (1976) and Hildenbrand and Jerison 
(1989). Another example is Theorem 3 in John (1991) where it is es­
tablished the equivalence between NSD and <9RM plus homogeneity. 
We do not need to prove this result. As one can easily verify it can 
be deduced by the Lemmas and the Propositions presented in this 
paper.
Let us conclude this work with a final remark which shows how 
the method of proof adopted in the Lemmas can be usefully applied 
to obtain simple proofs of other results available in the literature. 
The following definitions are needed.





























































































SGLD (Strong Generalized Law of Demand) if the compensated de­
mand function s(q) is strictly monotone for all w and all linearly 
independent p and q , i.e.
P [s(q) -  f(p,w)] > 0,
for all (p, w) and all q ^  Ap, A > 0.
WARP Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference if for all (p,ic) and (q, w)
f(p,tc) ^  f(q, w) and p • f(q, ta) < w
imply
q • f(p, w) > w.
One more definition for continuously differentiable demand func­
tions:
DEFINITION 4. A demand function f(p,ie) in C\ is said to sat­
isfy property
ND if the matrix of substitution terms, S(p,w ), i.e. the Jacobian 
of the compensated demand evaluated at q =  p, is negative 
definite on the hyperplane Tp — {v G !Rf | v • p =  0}, i.e.
v • S(p, w) ■ v < 0
for all v G Tp.






























































































Take p and q such that f(p , 1) ^  f(q , 1) and p f(q , 1) < 1; one has to 
show that q • f(p , 1) > 1. By using the same argument as in Lemma 
1, there exists 0 <  t* < 1 such that p • f(f*q, 1) =  1; therefore, 
f(p , 1) is none other than the Slutsky compensated demand at point 
(<*q, 1), indeed, f(p , p • f(f*q, 1)) =  f(p , 1). Then SGLD implies 
< * q -f(p ,l )  >  1, i-e. q  f (p , l )  >  1. ■
The Remark is basically Lemma 2 of Kihlstrom et al. (1976). 
Moreover, by noting that for demand functions in C\, ND implies 
SGLD it follows at once that ND is a sufficient condition for the Weak 
Axiom of Revealed Preference. This result is exactly Theorem 2 of 
Kihlstrom et al. (1976) or equivalently the Remark of Hildenbrand 
and Jerison (1989).
A ppendix
Proof6 of Proposition 1.
We shall give a formal proof of part (a); the proof of (6) and (c) 
is very similar and is left to the reader. Let us show, first, that if 
dpi  is negative semi-definite then LD holds. For prices p and q £ P
6 This proof was adapted from the proof of Lemma 6.1, in Hilden­




























































































define the vector v =  q — p and consider the convex combination 
q(f) =  fq +  (1 — f)p, with 0 < t < 1. Define the function
g(t) =  v -  [f(q(t), w) -  f(p ,w )].
Since q(0) =  p and q (l)  =  q one has, ty(0) =  0 and g( 1) =  v • 
[f(q ,w ) - f ( p ,  u>)]. Differentiating g(t) yields
g'(t) =  v • dpf(q (t),w ) ■ v.
Since the matrix dpf  is negative semi-definite, the function g(t) is 
non increasing and taking into account that g(0) =  0, the function 
cannot be positive, so that
#(1) =  v  • [f(q, w) -  f(p ,w )j < 0.
To prove the converse notice that since q (t) — p =  tv, the func­
tion g(t) can be rewritten as
g(t) =  y(q(0 -  p) • [f(q(0>w ) -  f (p> w)j ■
One has to prove that the matrix of price derivatives is negative semi- 
definite. If LD holds the function g(t) cannot be positive, g(t) < 0, 
for t > 0, and since g(0) =  0 the slope of the function in f =  0 must 
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